Where and when do natural rivers become unstable? To answer this question, we visually estimated bank-failure extent in 100-m increments along 180 km of riverbanks in three watersheds of the northern Yellowstone ecosystem. The riverbank data reveal precise power-law relationships between the number of bank failures of a given size throughout each watershed and the magnitude of those bank failures. The slopes of log-log graphs (i.e., the exponent t) of bank-failure magnitude versus failure frequency in alluvial reaches vary from 1.07 to 1.44, while t for all reaches combined (alluvial, colluvial, and bedrock) varies from 1.18 to 1.53, suggesting that lower-gradient, alluvial streams are more susceptible to large bank failures. Cellular automata simulations of riverbanks show similar power-law failure relationships, as do bank-erosion data from a long-term independent dataset from another location. These power-law structures can be interpreted as the spatial signal of a self-organized critical (SOC) system, in which local instabilities function to generate broader-scale order. SOC systems are considered to be at the ''edge of chaos,'' where local processes interact to make prediction of specific failure events impossible, although probability distribution prediction of the magnitude and spatial frequency of those events is possible. A critical structure of this sort is to be expected in bank failures along a stream given a nonlinear diffusive system such as a drainage basin. If riverbanks are, in fact, part of a critical system, then long-term local or watershed-wide stability is an unlikely or even impossible engineering or restoration goal. The existence of criticality in natural stream settings suggests that local human alterations designed to increase channel stability, while changing the local frequency of small failures, will only encourage an increase in the magnitude of system-wide, low-frequency large failures. A restoration or stabilization effort will not eliminate the bank instability. Instead, it will transfer that instability to neighboring riverbank areas.
U nderstanding patterns and processes of stream bank failure is critical to predicting and explaining changes in river form, provides key information for river-hazard assessment, and helps guide stream management and restoration. ''Bank failure,'' a phrase we use to indicate all forms of bank erosion and mass wasting, is generated by a number of different processes that operate locally to create a complex mosaic of bank erosion and stability along the stream system. Although the individual processes controlling bank failure in different locales have been well defined (e.g., Lawler 1992 Lawler , 1993 , our understanding of the basin-wide distribution of bank failure and stability is still in its infancy. Few geographic studies have looked at basin-wide distributions of bank failure per se (Lawler et al. 1999) , focusing instead on watershed-wide distributions of lateral migration and overall stream cross-sectional changes as a function of disturbances such as agriculture (e.g., Knox 1977) , loss of vegetative cover (Graf 1979) , climate change (Graf 1987) , channelization (Simon 1989) , dams (Williams and Wolman 1984) , and urbanization (Trimble 1997) . Although the changes in channel cross-sections and the controlling processes documented by these and other researchers are related to bank failure, they are not direct measures of that phenomenon. Furthermore, the channel changes documented in previous studies are all based on a limited number of measurements along the stream, which potentially miss the depth of detail and pattern that could be revealed by a continuous sample along an entire stream length. In this article, we document bank failure along 180 km of stream length in the northern Yellowstone ecosystem, examine how well these patterns fit within the theoretical context of selforganized criticality, and discuss some of the practical implications of these findings.
Bank Failure and the Concept of Self-Organized Criticality
Because bank processes are directly connected to width adjustments, stream-bank stability, and sediment-loading, they have been the subject of much research and lie at the heart of many channel-change software programs (Chang 1980; Darby and Thorne 1994; Darby, Gessler, and Thorne 2000) . Common to this research and the software models is the use of process-based and/or probabilistic bank-stability models to estimate the locations and sizes of active bank failures along streams (Darby and Thorne 1996; Lawler et al. 1999 ).
An alternative conceptual model for bank-failure distributions is that of a self-organized critical system in which both spatial and temporal trends in bank failure exhibit power-law magnitude/frequency distributions. ''Selforganized'' refers to systems that can change internally (i.e., organize themselves) without any change in the magnitude and frequency of external inputs to the system. Within this broad definition, however, researchers have used the term ''self-organized'' to describe and explain systems with very different internal controlling processes, behaviors, and resulting landscape patterns (Phillips 1999a) . Some of these self-organizing processes will lead to widespread divergence in possible system endpoints; others will induce the system to converge on a single endpoint. In this article, we focus on the concept of ''selforganized criticality'' (SOC), which refers to systems in which a suite of local and often very different processes generates a singular global (i.e., convergent) pattern. This pattern describes the system as a whole, but cannot be used to predict behavior at a specific locale at a given instant. The spatial pattern that is characteristic of SOC systems is a power law relating the frequency of a phenomenon to its magnitude (Bak 1996) .
Whether it is a power spectrum of temporal data or spatial data, the log-log size distribution graph has a characteristic form for all SOCs, although these distributions are not confined to SOC systems (Phillips 1999a) . The basic rule that there are ''small numbers of big events, large numbers of small events'' is quantified by Equation 1:
where N(S) is the number of events of size S and t is the slope of the line defining the relationship. If a linear ttrend fits the frequency data well over a large range of event magnitudes, the system is likely self-organizing and may be at the critical state (Bak 1996) . Temporal trends that fit this pattern are referred to as having ''1/f noise,'' and spatial patterns that fit this description are ''scaleinvariant fractal structures.'' The value of t, also known as the fractal dimension, can be found through logarithmic transformation of the variables in Equation 1 and solving for t using least-squares regression, where A is the slopeintercept:
Previous research provides several lines of evidence that suggest that riverbank failure might be an SOC system at the basin scale. First, dissipative systems (i.e., systems that lose energy) with multiple degrees of freedom are commonly SOC systems (Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld 1987) . Rivers, which lose potential energy and remove water and sediment from their source areas, are inherently dissipative (Gu et al. 1987) . Second, bank failures are closely related to width adjustments, which, in turn, have been shown to display characteristics of self-organized systems. Width adjustment is an extremely important subject in the prediction of channel change (Chang 1980; Ferguson 1986; Rhoads 1988; Darby et al. 1998; Thorne 1998) and in the engineering of river channels (Parker 1978; Simon 1994) . Phillips (1990 Phillips ( , 1991 has shown that changes in at-a-station hydraulic geometry-including changes in width-show multiple modes of adjustment to a change of an internal variable such as discharge, resistance, or slope. For example, at a given cross-section, a given discharge may be accommodated one day by a relatively narrow but deep channel, the next day by a wider and shallower channel. Phillips (1991 Phillips ( , 1999b showed that these different modes of adjustment indicate nonlinear local instability. The multiple modes of adjustment and local instability have been previously linked to ''steady-state,'' ''maximum-entropy,'' and ''instability/chaos'' theories of behavior, all of which can be modes of selforganization (Phillips 1999a) . Regardless of the overarching theory, the fact that local instability is characteristic of hydraulic geometry suggests that bank failures, which are related to width adjustment, may be an SOC phenomena.
Lastly, many geomorphic systems exhibit fractal or near-fractal structure typical of SOC systems, because they have power-law magnitude/frequency distributions. Beginning with Mandelbrot (1982) , much of the research concerning fractals has examined the fractal nature of topographic shape at a point in time. The research into 1/f noise has focused on the magnitude/frequency relationships of a system through time, but has included no explicit description of spatial patterns. Topics as different as river flows, earthquake distributions, traffic flows, and urban growth have been shown to exhibit 1/f noise (Bak 1996) . In laboratory experiments, sandpile dynamics have been studied extensively to catalog the patterns of both spatial fractal forms and temporal 1/f noise Wiesenfeld 1987, 1988; Somfai, Czirok, and Vicsek 1994) . In the field, the size of mass movements in the Himalaya (Noever 1993; Haigh 2000) and rock falls in Northern Ireland (Douglas 1980 ) has displayed power distributions. Gomez and colleagues (2002) used a 2,250-year record of lacustrine sedimentation as evidence for SOC behavior over time of landslide mechanisms in New Zealand. In an area more closely aligned with rivers and bank failure, Stlum (1997 Stlum ( , 1998 has shown that river meanders and oxbow cutoffs display fractal dimensions and are SOC systems.
In combination, the previous research on the dissipative nature of rivers, the dynamical instability of hydraulic geometry, and the fractal nature of many geomorphic systems suggest-but certainly do not prove-that bank failure at the basin scale might be an SOC phenomenon. One way to evaluate if this is a reasonable starting point is to build a simple model and see if simulated distributions of bank failure display SOC behavior.
Cellular Stream Automata Simulation of Bank Failure
On the theoretical side of SOC research, many generalizations have been produced using cellular automata simulations with simple addition, threshold, and movement rules (Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld 1987; Theiler 1993; Middleton and Tang 1995; Stlum 1996; Hergarten and Neugebauer 1998; Maslov, Tang, and Zhang 1999; Kloster, Maslov, and Tang 2001) . Cellular automata are models that consist of grids of cells, with each cell having a limited number of possible ''states.'' For example, the number of states of one cell might be five, where the states are limited to integers Z1 and r5. The state of each cell is updated in time steps according to a set of rules, which depend on the state of the cell and/or the adjacent cells. Cellular-automata models are inherently spatial and therefore are an effective means of simulating geographical change through time. Cellular models of geographic processes can demonstrate highly realistic physical behavior (Malanson 1999) , and cellular simulations of river flow are quickly approaching the level of realism supplied by partial differential equation models of hydrodynamics (Thomas and Nicholas 2002) .
Unlike many dynamical, process-based models, automata models are not intended to reproduce the dynamics of a system in detail. Rather, they are usually extremely simplified models of reality designed to determine the possible spatial and temporal patterns that a system might display. The automata approach is easily generalizable to many questions. For example, cellular-automata models of river-braiding reveal fractal spatial patterns that have excellent correlation with actual braided river systems (Murray and Paola 1994 Foufoula-Georgiou 1996, 1997; Sapozhnikov et al. 1998 ). Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld (1987) have shown that SOC systems invariably form a fractal power-law pattern through space and time. The potential to generate a fractal pattern is, therefore, a necessary first condition for determining if a system might be SOC.
To see if a power-law magnitude/frequency relationship for bank failure can be generated synthetically, we modified Bak and colleagues' (1987) original sandpile automata. We constructed a three-column-wide, onehundred-row long lattice. The first and third columns correspond to bank and near-bank sediment units. The center column corresponds to the in-channel sediment system. At the beginning of each time step, a discrete sediment unit with a value of 1 is added to one of the top (upstream) three cells, with the cell being randomly chosen (Figure 1) . The rules governing movement of the sediment units embody the conservation of mass and downstream transport within the sediment system. If the height of sediment in a cell increases above three, the three sediment units cascade to their immediate three downstream neighbor cells. If one of those cells is the automata boundary, that sediment unit is removed from the system (analogous to sediment storage on floodplains). After any cascades within the system have finished and are counted, another sediment unit is added from the upstream end of the lattice, indicating the next time step (Figure 2 ). These are the only rules necessary to generate our riverbank automata simulation. The automata is a ''channel-centered'' discrete automata, because disturbances are introduced from upstream sediment inputs, rather than channel side inputs.
After two hundred time steps, a strong magnitude/ frequency pattern of avalanche sizes appears (Figure 3 ). This pattern exists despite enormous temporal complexity in modeled cascade pattern (Figure 4) . The automata generates a highly significant (R 2 5 0.98) power-law distribution of bank failures with a t-exponent of 1.496. In addition to the research cited above, the ability of a simple cellular automata model of bank failure to generate SOC-like behavior suggests that real-world riverbank failures might be an SOC system.
Study Area
Our study sites were the third-to fourth-order portions of Cache, Soda Butte, and Tom Miner Creeks, which are part of the Yellowstone River basin ( Figure 5 ). We chose to work in these streams because they display a wide range of stream bank and watershed characteristics, are relatively free of human impacts on stream morphology, and are part of ongoing studies into disturbance impacts on stream systems. These gravel-and cobble-dominated creeks occupy broad glacial-trough floors and are primarily alluvial, with short stretches of colluvial or bedrock control interspersed throughout them (Meyer 2001) . The Soda Butte and Cache Creek basins are underlain by similar Eocene volcaniclastic geology and have similar surface cover, although the differences in the average channel slopes, and thus the degrees of hillslope control on the creeks, are substantial (Table 1) . Tom Miner Creek basin is underlain by small areas of Eocene volcanics and large areas of Quaternary glacial, lacustrine, colluvial, and alluvial surficial deposits. Its average elevation is lower than those of Cache and Soda Butte Creeks, but its mean channel slope is higher (Table 1) .
A large percentage of Cache Creek was burned during the Yellowstone fires of 1988, whereas most of Soda Butte Creek and all of Tom Miner Creek remained unburned. There are almost no human modifications to the channels, although heavy metals from an upper basin tailings pond dam-break were emplaced in the floodplain areas of Soda Butte Creek in 1950 (Marcus, Meyer, and Nimmo 2001) and Tom Miner basin experiences some grazing. Holocene terrace materials show that major flood-induced modifications to the alluvial reaches of Soda Butte Creek may persist locally over periods greater than one hundred years (Meyer 2001) .
Soda Butte Creek displays a wide variety of planform geometry along its length, ranging from braided in some reaches to confined in colluvial/bedrock stretches to broadly meandering in others (Meyer 2001) . Cache Creek is similar, although the channel confinement by valley walls and steeper average channel slopes lead to fewer broad meander bends and braided segments than in Soda Butte Creek. The upper half of Tom Miner Creek has welldefined meanders, where the channel wanders through relatively low gradient meadows. In its lower half, Tom Miner Creek is confined by bedrock and colluvium, and the channel is relatively straight and steep. All three creeks have a mix of coniferous forest and meadow along their banks, although the majority of forest in Cache Creek has been burned. Tom Miner Creek is the only one of the creeks that has well-developed willow communities along its banks.
The banks of these streams display varying degrees of instability throughout the basins. In the broad, alluvial reaches, bank processes reflect lateral migration of the meandering or sometimes braided channels ( Figure 6A and B). In these areas, banks are built up through vertical and lateral accretion during floods and fail through oversteepening during moderate flow and flood-scour periods. In the colluvial reaches of the creeks, undercutting of banks occurs during large floods, and the banks are built up through hillslope diffusion processes ( Figure 6C ). The 
Methods
In order to characterize the distribution of local bank failure throughout entire basins, we documented the percentage of bank erosion on the left and right banks of 100-m reaches along the large majority of main channel stream length within each creek. In Soda Butte and Cache Creeks, field crews mapped 367 and 192 reaches, respectively, in July and August 2000. In June 2001, the same crew surveyed 143 reaches in Tom Miner Creek.
Identifying bank failure requires subjective decisions by the field mapper. To minimize subjectivity, we used the following criteria to identify failure: presence of fresh failure scarps; lack of vegetation on bank slopes in an otherwise vegetated area; collapse of streamside biota into the channel; and the occurrence of undercutting features in the bank walls. In order to avoid differences between reaches and basins due to surveyor-dependent bias, the same individual conducted all the bank-failure measurements in all three watersheds. A laser rangefinder provided distance measurement of the failure lengths along the left and right banks of each 100-m reach. The accuracy of bank-failure estimates is probably on the order of 75 m along each 100-m length of bank. In addition to length of bank failure within each reach, the field crews also noted whether bank materials were alluvial, colluvial, or bedrock. Slopes for each reach were derived from 1:24,000 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) topographic maps of the region.
Magnitude/spatial frequency plots are easily constructed by plotting the length of bank failures within 100-m reaches versus the number of occurrences of failures of that size. Because the accuracy in bank-failure magnitudes was 75 m, and in order to create a large enough sample size within each failure-size category, we binned the erosion estimates for each 100-m reach into 10-m classes. In order to allow direct comparisons of graphs between basins that had different numbers of reaches, we used a ''proportional frequency,'' rather than just the number of failures of a given size class. Proportional frequency is simply the percentage of the total number of observations (e.g., reaches) made up by observations of a given magnitude class: mathematically, proportional frequency 5 (number of occurrences of a magnitude class / number of reaches) Â 100. 
The Magnitude and Frequency of Bank Failures
The field maps of bank failures in Cache, Soda Butte, and Tom Miner Creeks reveal significant spatial heterogeneity in failure patterns. For example, Figure 7 shows the downstream pattern of erosion amounts on the left bank of all reaches in Cache Creek. Similarly heterogeneous spatial patterns emerge for all the streams.
However, although the spatial patterns appear random, the magnitude/frequency relations for bank failures along all three streams display remarkably consistent power-law scaling of failure events (Figures 8 and 9 ). The nonsystematic density of points across the x-axis in each figure is due to linear binning being transferred to a logarithmic axis. The overall log-log form of the relation was insensitive to changes in bin intervals ranging from 5 to 20 meters. Table 2 shows the equations for the power-line relationships. Figure 8A shows the failure magnitude distributions for the left and right banks in all reaches of Cache Creek. The slope of t calculated through least-squares regression is approximately 1.42, with most of the deviation from the linear trend occurring in the distribution of large failures. This is to be expected, given the relatively small sample size in the large failure categories relative to other classes. The slopes of the Cache Creek lines are fairly high relative to results from Soda Butte Creek (Table 2) . One possibility for this higher exponent is the increased average energy in Cache Creek, because its slope is twice as high as that in Soda Butte Creek (Table 1 ). The increased energy may transmit signals through the basin more quickly and efficiently, increasing the overall proportion of small failures and not allowing the bank materials necessary for large avalanches to build up very frequently.
Bank failures in all reaches of Soda Butte Creek exhibit a similar power-law trend to those in Cache Creek ( Figure  8B ). The primary difference is the lower value of t (B1.2) in Soda Butte Creek, which is probably due to its lower overall channel slopes. The overall lower slope and reduced stream energies in Soda Butte Creek allow greater amounts of bank material to be stored throughout the basin before cascading down the system. The excellent fit of the linear trend line (R 2 E 0.91) gives added support to the universality of fractal bank-failure patterns throughout the mountain river system.
The strength of the power-law relationship (R 2 E0.89) in Tom Miner basin demonstrates that the power-scaling is not limited to similar streams immediately adjacent to one another, such as Cache and Soda Butte Creeks. Indeed, Tom Miner Creek's channel slope, elevation, Quaternary history, burn percentage (0 percent), substrate, land use, and cross-sectional morphology are all profoundly different from those of the streams we measured in Yellowstone Park, yet the power-scaling of streambank failures persists. The t-exponent values for all reaches in Tom Miner (1.533 for the left bank, 1.492 for the right bank) are also higher than those of any other measured basin, as we expected, given the high channel slope (Table 1) . The Tom Miner t-exponent values are, however, similar to the cellular automata model t value of 1.496.
The apparent relation between channel slope and the slope of the log-log magnitude/frequency diagrams suggests that portions of the same basin with different gradients may have different power laws. This issue can be evaluated in the study areas by extracting the relatively low-gradient, alluvial reaches from the dataset, which maintains a large enough sample size for binning (Table 2 ). Figure 9 shows the failure-magnitude distributions where only the bank failures within alluvial reaches are plotted for the three basins. In all the creeks, the t exponent is lower than for the graphs containing data from all reaches ( Table 2 ). If our hypothesis is correct, the lower t values result from the greater sediment storage due to overall lower channel slopes, which, in turn, creates more opportunity for large bank failures. It should be noted that the t values for only the alluvial reaches in Cache Creek are roughly equal to the t values for all the reaches in Soda Butte Creek. This is consistent with the channel slopes of alluvial reaches in Cache Creek being approximately equal to the average slopes of all reaches in Soda Butte Creek. Other variables besides channel slope may influence the t-exponents. For example, in Cache Creek, large-magnitude burning of the basin forests in 1988 released a large quantity of sediment and woody debris into the channel system, possibly influencing t. However, the effects of these inputs are likely correlated with channel slope, which complicates the separations of these variables in our analysis. In addition, t-tests show no statistically significant differences in the values of the t-exponent for any reach or basin. We suspect that this is due to the low number of data points in each regression equation (less than fifteen), rather than the failure of our hypothesized physical relationships. Finally, our maps of bank-failure patterns suggest that there was a limit to the largest bank-failure size at the time of mapping, with the largest failures being on the order of 100 to 200 m in length. It is not clear whether the log-log pattern breaks down within the Yellowstone systems at these larger failure sizes, or whether it is simply a matter of these larger failures being so infrequent in time and space that a larger or longer sample would be required to capture them.
Robustness of the Power Law for Bank Failure
To further test the robustness of the power-law distribution of bank failures, we examined spatial bankfailure volume data collected by Ruth (1988) on the North Fork Flathead River, northwest Montana, over the period between 1945 and 1981. The North Fork is an order of magnitude larger stream than the Yellowstone study sites. It has a basin area of 4,009 km 2 and an annual mean flow of 86 cms-nineteen times the average discharge in Soda Butte Creek, which is our only study site with a USGS gaging station. Ruth (1988) mapped spatial occurrences of failure in a manner similar to our study, but collected more detailed data on the volume at each failure site using sequential aerial photographs. Areas of bank erosion during the period between 1945 and 1981 had materialloss volumes between 1,000 and 779,599 m 3 , with the vast majority (B99 percent) of failure areas having volume losses between 1,000 and 100,000 m 3 . In order to bin the data into 5,000-m 3 categories for magnitude/frequency analysis, and to avoid creating bins with zero frequency values in them (e.g., no erosional zones occurred with volumes between 220,000 and 225,000 m 3 , and so this zero frequency bin cannot be plotted on a log-log graph), we restricted our analysis to failure volumes between 1,000 and 100,000 m 3 . Figure 10 demonstrates the magnitude/frequency relation for the Flathead River using Ruth's (1988) data for 208 sites. The t exponent of the best-fit line (R 2 5 0.86) in Figure 10 is 1.32, and the intercept A is 6.489. Because the Yellowstone data is percent bank failure and the North Flathead data is volume of erosion, the t-exponents cannot directly be compared between the two stream systems. Nevertheless, the similarity in the failure trends from the two sets of data is striking.
Discussion Hypothesis: Bank Failure as an SOC System
The modern geomorphologist typically explains landscape features and events in a process-based, cause-andeffect manner. Following this model, one would anticipate being able to explain the log-log magnitude/frequency distributions in our study areas as a function of the distribution of physical parameters such as bank height or stream power. Although we did not collect an exhaustive set of hydraulic and bank parameters, the lack of sitespecific associations between stream power, stream width, and slope with bank failure (Table 3) suggests that an alternative perspective is needed to understand the distribution of failures at the basin scale. We hypothesize that the log-log distributions of bank-failure magnitudes and frequencies in our study areas are general ''power laws'' for natural rivers, and that the theory of SOC provides the appropriate framework for explaining these distributions.
That bank failure is an SOC phenomenon is suggested by several lines of evidence. First, bank failure in all basins exhibited a power-law relationship, a necessary first condition for SOC. Second, as Table 3 shows, the magnitudes and locations of bank failures are not clearly associated with local hydraulic variables, suggesting that local process controls do not provide an adequate explanation of behavior at the basin scale. Third, the cellular automata model used simple rules to produce power-law distributions, indicating the potential for SOC behavior of bank failure. Finally, existing literature indicates the potential for bank-failure processes to array themselves through space to create power-law distributions.
Other studies support the potential for SOC behavior through several different lines of reasoning. If the SOC behavior partially arises due to in-channel processes, as suggested by the automata model, then scale-invariant magnitude/frequency power laws control the erosion and Figure 10 . Log-log failure size distribution in the North Fork Flathead River, Montana. Source: Ruth (1988) . aggradation of the channel bed, thus reducing or enhancing bank stability through under-or oversteepening. Andrews (1982) hypothesized this general causal relationship in the analysis of bank failure in the East Fork River in the Wind River range of Wyoming. Alternatively, processes internal to the banks may contribute to bank failure. Pelletier and colleagues (1997) showed that distributions of soil moisture obey a power law that is of great importance in controlling the magnitude/frequency distribution of landslides.
At first blush, the hypothesis that riverbank failures are an SOC system appears to run counter to some of the recent process-based research on this topic. From a localarea process perspective, for example, research has examined the effects of hydraulic shear and pore-water pressure on the instability of river banks (Simon and Collison 2001) and the effects of flow events on cohesion loss and subsequent bank failure during the falling limb of flow events (Lawler and Leeks 1992; Lawler, Thorne, and Hooke 1997; Rinaldi and Casagli 1999) . Using these models, local failures can be explained if one knows the bank characteristics and the sequence of bank wetting and discharges.
At the large basin scale, Lawler's (1992) process-based zonal model postulates that failures in the upper basin are dominated by subaerial process, such as freeze-thaw weathering, wetting and drying of bank materials, and root throw. The general tendency for stream power to peak in midbasin areas (Graf 1983; Lawler 1992; Magilligan 1992; Lecce 1997; Knighton 1999; Fonstad forthcoming) leads to fluvial entrainment dominating in these reaches. In lower areas of a large basin, the increase in channel size reaches a point at which mass failure of the banks dominates in-channel and subaerial processes. Researchers have generally found this conceptual model to be correct (e.g., Lawler et al. 1999 ), although they have noted variations due to sediment mobility and stream power (Couperthwaite et al. 1996; ) and vegetation (Abernethy and Rutherford 1998) . Greater channel mobility in midbasin reaches, documented by Lewin (1987) , lends inferential support to the model. But these process-based explanations at both local and basin scales may not be in conflict with the concept of bank failure as an SOC phenomenon. At the local scale, high levels of within-reach process variability (Lewin 1987; Hooke and Redmond 1989) are similar to the fractal variability predicted in an SOC system. At the basin scale, we postulate that the downstream zonality of average bank instability and erosion rates discussed by Abernethy and Rutherfurd (1998) and Lawler and colleagues (1999) may reflect variations in the t-exponent coincident with the spatial patterns of stream power, bank materials, and subaerial processes in their respective study basins. We suspect that the lower erosion potential in the zones corresponds to higher t-exponents, and that higher potential corresponds with lower t-values. Of course, the spatial patterns of these processes may be different in other areas, and may be affected by other processes, including those of human agency.
In our study area, however, the only process-based statement we can make with certainty regarding the magnitude/frequency distribution of bank failures is that the maximum magnitude of events is limited by the presence of bedrock reaches. Beyond this structural limit, the data from our study do not explain why bank-failure processes array themselves at the basin scale to cause power laws. We suspect that the large-area processes in each basin are homogenous enough as to allow, through time, many permutations of failure location, each of which can fulfill the power-law distribution. For example, a huge number of different patterns exist, all of which could fulfill the power-law condition for SOC status in Cache Creek, but be vastly different than the spatial arrangement depicted in Figure 7 due to system-wide adjustments through time. While none of the above lines of reasoning provide conclusive proof that bank failure is an SOC phenomenon, all point to a system that behaves in a manner consistent with SOC theory. If bank failure is indeed an SOC phenomenon, it has profound implications for explanation, prediction, and modeling of stream behavior, management approaches, and measurement and characterization of streams. The following sections discuss these topics, as well as suggesting future lines of research needed to test the SOC hypothesis.
Explanation, Prediction, and Modeling Approaches in an SOC Bank-Failure System
The strength of the power law is that it clearly documents the distribution that the system maintains in order to stay critical. Much as a sandpile acts to maintain the angle of repose regardless of environmental conditions, so will the riverbank-failure system. To understand behavior of an SOC system, therefore, the entire basin -not the individual failure-must be viewed as the functional unit (Bak 1996) . Only by looking at the distribution of all the failures throughout the basin can we understand the system state and anticipate the long-term or basin-wide probabilities of a failure of a given size. In contrast, magnitude/frequency distributions in a non-SOC system could change over time as external forcing variables or internal conditions vary, and thus do not provide the same level of predictive power.
Thus, applications of SOC theory to modeling of bank failure will only work for predicting the basin-wide distribution of failures of a given size at a given time, or in predicting the probability distribution through time of events of a given size at specific sites. The data in this article suggest, for example, that channel gradient may play a role in controlling the slope and y-intercept of the magnitude/frequency curve. Such information could be used to predict the change in magnitude and frequency of basin-wide bank failures, site-specific failure probabilities, and sediment-loading due to gradient changes associated with dams, other control structures, changes in base level, or other watershed-wide disturbances. This type of systems-wide, nonreductionist spatial explanation clearly has a broad place in the discussion of geographical phenomena and approaches to modeling stream behavior.
While SOC theory in the context of riverbank failure can provide valuable description, explanation, and prediction at the basin scale, it does not ''explain'' anything in the site-specific, cause-and-effect, reductionist sense familiar to process-based geomorphologists. In an SOC system, big and small events (e.g., bank failures) can be driven by the same process (e.g., bank undercutting) or different processes (undercutting in one place, freeze-thaw wedging in another), with the size of failure dependent not only on the process but also on the overall state of the system (distributions of bank sediment and channel condition) at that time. One cannot, therefore, use an existing distribution of bank failures (e.g., Figure 7 ) to determine the local processes behind failures. The system may be driven by simple local rules like those of our automata model, or by a complex overlay of rules related to different processes. In either case, the resultant basin-wide pattern is complex beyond our ability to unravel specific cause-and-effect relations from the overall pattern.
The statement that the bank system exhibits SOC behavior suggests an important role for process-based predictive models, but only at a site over the short term. What the process-based models lack is explanation of why the conditions at a given site approach a critical state of failure in the first place, which is a function of the integrated system in which the site is located. One could monitor all the critical conditions at a given grain of sand in a sandpile, but these measurements do not help predict the site failure that results due to a collapse farther downslope. If bank failure is indeed an SOC phenomenon, it suggests a system-driven limit on our ability to accurately model local bank failure.
Many of the models widely used by river scientists and managers attempt to predict the kind of local bank stability that cannot be predicted over the long-term in an SOC system. Perhaps the most common example of this is the use of empirical hydraulic geometry equations to determine channel dimensions for restoration or reconstruction of streams. Hydraulic geometry equations estimate appropriate widths, depths, and other channel characteristics for a given discharge (Leopold and Maddock 1953) . Although hydraulic-geometry equations do not directly estimate bank failure, many modern-day practitioners implicitly assume that choosing the correct channel dimensions will create a ''stable'' stream. The linkages between bank failure and channel dimensions suggest, however, that this assumption is wrong. If bank failure operates as an SOC system, then the local channel will adjust in a large variety of ways to accommodate the system-wide demands needed to maintain criticality.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate this is to look at data from Soda Butte Creek in our study area, where the hydraulic-geometry-based estimates of stream width provide only a very poor estimate of the overall variability in actual stream widths (Figure 11 ). In some cases, bankfull widths may be as much as several hundred percent larger or smaller than predicted by the basin curves alone. These deviations result from many factors, including heterogeneous bedrock units, historical knickpoint development, spatial variation in hillslope processes, and the interruption of the channel mainstem by material from side tributaries. The large variability shown in Figure 11 indicates that using hydraulic geometry to estimate local widths for the entire basin that are ''stable'' will be entirely misleading. It would make far more sense to use the probability distribution of both bankfull widths and bank failures to plan riparian corridors based on the range of conditions that a reach could be expected to experience through time.
In examining Figure 11 , one might speculate that the problem is simply one of resolution: that the hydraulic geometry captures the average trend, but does not include enough local detail to accurately predict local channel dimensions. In this case, a more sophisticated model with more parameters should provide a better fit. But this is a reductionist perspective of the model, suggesting that if we had even more measurements, the system could be modeled accurately. From an SOC perspective, the problem is that the cross-section or multiple cross-sections perspective focuses on each locale, rather on than the linked system, which acts as a whole to maintain criticality. Whether failure occurs depends not only on the local process, but also on the distribution of bank failures and distributions throughout the entire basin, which act in concert to determine where and when failure will occur.
The spatially linked nature of critical systems calls into question the major channel-measurement technique used by many scientists for predicting river behavior: the channel cross-section. If channel stability is truly an SOC system, then universal spatial coverage similar to a cellular automata is necessary to characterize the channel system. A few measurements of a single cross-section's bank properties will not allow a researcher to estimate the spatial variability required to understand the probability distribution of streambank failure. Instead, many measurements are required through time at a site-or, alternatively, many are needed through space. Through these extensive measurements, the probability distribution of bank failure can be determined and used in engineering and decision making.
Implications for Stream Management
All stream management is aimed at achieving certain stream states (e.g., ''natural,'' ''stable,'' ''flood-free,'' etc.). By and large, managers target goals they believe are obtainable. Their understanding of what is ''obtainable'' is based upon their understanding of how the stream system works. In practical terms, this means that most stream managers use hydraulic geometry to characterize downstream morphologic changes at the basin scale, use some variant of magnitude/frequency curves of discharge/ stream power coupled with sediment size measurements to estimate entrainment/erosion threshold changes, and use at-a-station hydraulic geometry and/or classical engineering to understand local channel configuration. This basis of understanding means that most managers view the system as one in which basin-wide variations can be predicted as a function of basin area or annual discharge, with local variations being a function of extreme events (e.g., floods) and/or local channel variations in bank characteristics. This view of the stream supports the belief that structural or nonstructural alterations to the channel can be used to create a ''stable'' reach, so long as the flow resistance, channel geometry, and bank composition fit within envelopes determined by stability analysis, entrainment estimates, and discharge limits. Much of the industry of stream restoration is based largely on this belief (Leopold, Silvey, and Rosgen 1998; Kondolf, Smeltzer, and Railsback 2001) .
Bank failure as an SOC phenomenon directly refutes this belief. The explicit linkage of local behavior to an entire system maintaining itself at criticality means that local failure or stability will vary primarily as a function of the basin-wide distribution of failure, not just as a function Figure 11 . Downstream distance versus bankfull widths in Soda Butte Creek. The dark line is the downstream hydraulic geometry prediction for bankfull width (width 5 4.37*drainage area 0.275 ). The ''stepped'' appearance in the bankfull trend is due to the additive effects of incoming tributaries on the channel width. The coefficient of determination (R 2 ) of this predicted curve is 0.14. of local form and process. If the power laws observed in riverbank failures do indeed result from an SOC system, then ''long-term local stability''-a common goal of river engineering and restoration-is nearly impossible.
Of course, completely covering a riverbank throughout an entire river system will reduce all of the low-magnitude, high-frequency events, but the question remains as to whether these will withstand high magnitude events. Experience with other SOC systems such as sandpiles shows that local alterations to the system will not change the criticality of the global SOC structure at all. Even if intensive local knowledge (such as installing rip-rap on the banks) is used to change the local system, there will be little or no effect on the system-wide critical pattern. The local ''stabilization'' will only increase the smallmagnitude events in the surrounding area, and will provide little protection for the local area from largermagnitude failures. Indeed, such suppression of small failures only encourages the more rare larger-magnitude failures to be even larger. Forest fires provide an analogous situation, in which suppression of small fires increases the magnitude ;of rare, low-frequency fires because the system is self-organized to a critical state (Malamud, Morein, and Turcotte 1998) . This global insensitivity to local alteration is the general nature of an SOC system.
The presence of SOC phenomenon in streams does lend credence, however, to managers to whom we have spoken who make the case for use of ''best professional judgment.'' Local-scale variations in SOC systems can be explained and predicted in the short term through a detailed historical narrative in which the local setting is watched over time and its response to many far-flung system-wide variations is monitored. Gould (1989) makes the case that ''storytelling'' is the best approach for explaining outcomes in a system of this nature, because so many contingencies can influence what occurs. This suggests an important role for the historically minded geomorphologist and for river managers who have extensive local knowledge.
Future Research
There are many possible avenues for future analysis of SOC phenomena in the context of bank-erosion patterns. Perhaps most fundamental is the question of whether power distributions for bank failure at the basin scale truly represent an SOC system or are indicators of some other suite of organizing processes.
At present, the normal means for ''proving'' SOC behavior for a geomorphic system is the presence of consistent linear log-log magnitude/frequency relations (Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld 1987) . But this is a pattern that can be generated by other self-organizing convergent systems (Phillips 1999a) , such as random walk networks or tuned, designed systems (Carlson and Doyle 1999) . It is possible that in a river system with a great deal of human design, power laws may be the result of human-optimized ''tuning''-such as the placement of stabilization structures-rather than the result of criticality.
Evaluating whether bank failures are an SOC system could be partially tested by developing more realistic rules for cellular automata simulations that have similar texponents to those measured in Cache, Soda Butte, and Tom Miner Creeks. Proposed rules could be tested for more general self-organizing behavior through simulation of observed power-laws. Additionally, future field samples should be large enough to use spectral analysis to test for fractal form and nonstationarity problems in the failure patterns.
Additionally, empirical evidence for bank-failure power laws, variation in the value of t, and the direct connection of bank-failure processes to SOC concepts and the understanding of hydraulic geometry is necessary in a broad range of river environments. Our research only tested spatial bank-failure power laws over a limited range of spatial scales (four orders of magnitude or less).
Also, it is important to understand the factors that influence the slopes of the bank-failure power laws. If general relationships between basin characteristics and these slopes can be found, quantitative predictions of spatial and temporal river instability could be made. In our study, we postulate channel slope to be the dominant factor in controlling the power-law slope, but there are undoubtedly many other influences, including those of human agency. Seasonal differences in riverbank processes may also influence the global t-value in highly active systems, and should be monitored to assess their general importance. In addition, basin-wide measurements of flow hydraulics and bank characteristics will be required to find the principle driving mechanisms behind the t-values of basins.
Finally, the SOC riverbank hypothesis predicts powerlaw scaling of bank failure through time, as well as space. How the temporal power laws are related to spatial power laws in a quantitative manner is of enormous importance in the realm of environmental decision making.
Conclusions
Over 1,400 observations from three separate watersheds reveal a power-law magnitude/frequency structure in bank-failure spatial patterns. This structure supports the proposal that the hydraulic geometry system and the intimately associated bank processes are a self-organized critical system. An advantage of the SOC riverbank conjecture is that if it is not correct, it is sufficiently rigorous to admit disproof. Far from being equilibrium forms, channel banks are poised at a nonequilibrium, critical state throughout a watershed. Temporal change of these systems will likely follow a 1/f noise distribution. Variations in the t-exponent between our measured channel reaches are likely due to overall channel-slope differences. If the channel-bank system is an SOC system, prediction of long-term change at individual banks will be difficult or impossible, although the prediction that the entire system will stay at a critical state will hold true. The system-global nature of an SOC system such as the channel-bank system suggests that alterations to stabilize local bank conditions will not change the global properties (such as the t-exponent) of the system, but will alter the local magnitude and frequency of events in surrounding bank areas, as well as increasing the magnitude of low-frequency events.
